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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff Mosell Equities proves itself incapable of adhering to the requisite standard this 
Court must adhere to in evaluating the trial court's grant of JNOV. Throughout its discussion, 
Mosell Equities highlights the evidence most favorable to itself, draws inferences in its own favor, 
ignores unfavorable findings by both the district court and the trial court and otherwise violates the 
applicable standard of review. I As this Court is fully aware, Mosell Equities is required to admit 
any adverse fact, and the Court must draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. It was up to the jury to assess credibility. The trial court's grant of JNOV is 
only proper if reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reflected in the jury's verdict. See, 
e.g., Schroeder v. Partin, _ Idaho _, 259 P .3d 617, 622 (2011). 
Mosell Equities continues to argue that Exhibit 1 is unambiguous, despite rulings by both 
the district court and the trial court to the contrary and despite its own failure to object to jury 
instructions in line with those rulings. Plaintiffs position that "a loan is a loan is a loan" reads the 
"transition" and "buy-in" language right out of Exhibit 1, as if it did not exist? Based on a proper 
Plaintiff even attempts to rely on a document not admitted into evidence. See, 
Respondent-Cross Appellant's Brief, at p. 2 and fn. 1. 
2 As the trial court noted at the JNOV hearing, the fact that the "loan" would be 
transitioned into an entity that never came into existence also rendered the language ambiguous: 
"it becomes ambiguous because there's no MoBerry Venture Corporation." (JNOV Tr., Vol. I, p. 
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evaluation of the evidence with the correct standard in mind, reasonable minds could reach the 
conclusion reflected in the jury's verdict. Accordingly, the trial court's grant of JNOV was 
inappropriate and should be vacated. 
Fatal to Mosell Equities' position, however, is that it failed to object pursuant to Rule 
51(b), LR.C.P., to the relevant jury instructions and special verdict in order to preserve the issue 
upon which the trial court granted JNOV. 
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S "STATEMENT OF FACTS" 
In its Statement of Facts, Mosell Equities largely relies on its own witnesses and draws 
inferences consistently in its own favor. Not satisfied at that, Plaintiff also recharacterizes the 
record starting early in its Brief. Regarding Exhibit 1, Plaintiff claims that "Mosell testified he 
asked Berryhill to write the note [Exhibit 1] as 'security for my "50,000.00 check,'" and cites to 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 315, L. 3 - p. 318, L.ll) (Respondent's Brief: 4). The actual testimony at that part 
of the transcript is: "Well, as security for my $50,000 check, I relied on John Berryhill's signature 
stating that it was a loan to be ultimately converted to equity in the new venture." 
Whether the parties intended Exhibit 1 to constitute an actual "loan" was obviously 
disputed, a fact Plaintiff refuses to face. John Berryhill testified: 
My understanding today, what the plaintiff is saying this loan means, is not what I 
understood when this was written, because that's not what he said. We never 
talked about that he could get it back. We never talked about it being a short-term 
loan. It was, as he stated, an inter - interim substitute. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 587, Ll. 4-9). The attorney working for the parties on the anticipated "buy-in" for 
38, Ll. 3-4) 
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"MoBerry Venture Corp," Kimbell Gourley, testified: 
Q. In that regard, was it ever your understanding, and in conversations with Mr. 
Mosell or Mr. Berryhill, that the transaction was going to take the form of a loan 
from Mosell Equities to Berryhill & Company? 
A. The term - to my recollection, the term loan was never used. I never understood that 
there was going to be a loan that was made. And to be honest with you, it would be 
inconsistent with -- with a capital contribution into a corporation. And so, I -
nobody discussed that with me. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 829, Ll. 14-24). 
Pretending again that its own testimony is undisputed, Plaintiff claims "[t]hereafter, over 
the next ten months, Glenn Mosell personally delivered nine other checks" (Respondent's Brief: 4) 
and "hand delivered each check, (Exhibits 1-10), to Berryhill and Berryhill accepted each check" 
(Respondent's Brief: 8). Some of these checks had the word loan on the memo line. Yet, 
Plaintiff's witness, Joy Luedtke, a disgruntled former manager and bookkeeper for Berryhill & 
Company, testified: 
Q. While you were working for Berryhill & Company up until October of2008, did 
the account, the equity account - or the long term liability account for Mosell 
Equities every change in - in form or manner? 
A. Yes, it increased. Periodically Glenn [Mosell] gave me checks. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 274, Ll. 10-16). For his part, John Berryhill testified: 
Q. Do you recall seeing all of those checks? 
A. I - I didn't see them all until the lawsuit. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. They would go to my general manager at the time, Joy Luedtke. 
(Tr. Vo!' I, p. 591, Ll. 4-9). 
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Plaintiff quotes Joy Luedtke as saying she changed the bookkeeping status of the check 
funds after she "cleared it with John [Berryhill]" (Respondent's Brief: 8). What Ms. Luedtke 
actually explained was: "We had a - after I went and talked with Amy Dempsey, I told John that 
she said, we - just leave it as long-term equity until everything is finalized, and John said okay." 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 270, Ll. 2-5). "All of the checks went in under a loan, as long-term equity. That 
was something that I discussed with Amy Dempsey, and it was decided that it would be left as a 
loan until the partnership paperwork was completed." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 268, Ll. 20-24). 
For her part, Amy Dempsey, the CPA for Berryhill & Company, when asked about how the 
funds were described in the Berryhill & Company bookkeeping, testified: "What that signified to 
me is that it was in a holding pattern until we had legal documentation to define how I was going to 
be able to treat those from an accounting standpoint." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 796, L. 24 - p. 797, L. 2). 
Thus, whatever inferences should be drawn from the bookkeeping entries were also disputed and 
Plaintiff is not entitled to draw them in its own favor. 
Regarding the relationship of the funds, the parties and the Polo Cove development, 
Plaintiff states in its Brief that "Berryhill presented evidence at trial that his 'name' and his 
'reputation' somehow added value to the failed Polo Cove project" (Respondent's Brief: 22). 
Yet, Plaintiff s owner acknowledged the truth of this claim. When testifying about his efforts to 
develop and market the Polo Cove development, Glenn Mosell testified: 
Q. Isn't it true that, nevertheless, the value of what you're trying to sell or to 
develop [Polo Cove] was greater because of the Berryhill name? 
A. And that's exactly why I paid $400,000 for half of the business, to use that 
name and to brand the wine country restaurant out there; true. 
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Q. And so, you paid the $400,000, and it was in part to recognize the value of 
the Berryhill name? 
A. Correct. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 362, Ll. 8-16) 
Elsewhere, upon further questioning regarding his desire to have the Berryhill brand as part of the 
Polo Cove development, Mosell testified: 
Q. If you recall, am I correct, Mr. Mosell, that this is the table - the first page, 
the table of contents, of your attorney Todd Lakey's submittal to the 
Canyon County Planning and Zoning Commission regarding the Polo Cove 
development? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And again, similar language on page six, if we can flip to it, under 3.2.2, 
restaurant, there's similar language about one of the southwest Idaho's most 
sought after chefs, do you see that? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And it's referred to your attorney, to planning and zoning in Canyon 
County, that he plans to build a centerpiece restaurant at the summit of the 
vineyards; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then, it goes on to talk about John being one of the - also one of the 
most successful and prolific caterers in the state -
A. Yes. 
Q. -- correct? 
And you agreed with the language in that submission to Canyon County, 
didn't you? 
A. Absolutely. That's why I paid $25,000 for John's consulting work and 
then $400,000 for that branding. 
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(Tr. Vol. I, p. 366, L. 23 - p. 367, L. 23) 
Thus, at trial, even Plaintiff's own principal, Glenn Mosell, did not consistently refer to the 
relevant funds as a loan and acknowledged they reflected rather the "buy-in," as well as Plaintiff's 
desire to purchase the Berryhill brand. 
Based on this evidence, as well as that described earlier in Appellant's Brief, the jury 
concluded that the parties did not intend a loan transaction. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Mosell Equities fails to excuse its failure to object to the relevant jury 
instructions. 
I.A.R. 35(b)(6) requires a respondent on appeal to set forth "the contentions of the 
respondent with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon." As this Court recently 
stated, 
Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6) requires that the argument division of an appellant's 
brief 'shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes 
and parts of the transcript and record relied upon.' Similarly, Rule 35(b)(6) 
requires that the argument division of a respondent's brief 'shall contain the 
contentions of the respondent with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the 
reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript 
and record relied upon.' Thus, both appellant and respondent have the same 
obligation to address the issues presented ... in the argument portion of their briefs. 
Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 805, n. 6 (Idaho 2010). 
In Appellant's Brief, Berryhill & Company demonstrated at No.1 of its Argument section 
that Mosell Equities failed to object to the relevant jury instructions concerning contract formation 
that then became the subject of the trial court's JNOV. Thus, Mosell Equities failed to preserve 
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this issue for consideration on a motion for JNOV and likewise on appeal. Mosell Equities 
responded with two sentences and without citation to authority: 
Berryhill's argument however ignores the reality that a motion for JNOV is merely 
a delayed motion for directed verdict. Jury instructions under the circumstances 
are immaterial and irrelevant if, as did Judge Goff, the Court had a legal basis to 
grant a directed verdict, but did so at the JNOV stage of the proceedings. 
(Respondent's Brief: 25). Such a bald statement does not fulfill Plaintiffs obligations under 
LA.R.35(b)(6). 
Perhaps the reason for Plaintiff s failure is that it could find no persuasive way of avoiding 
the application of the rule set forth in Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 203 P.3d 702 (2009), Jones v. 
Crawforth, 147 Idaho 11, 19-20,205 P.3d 660,668-669 (2009), Chapman v. Chapman, 147 Idaho 
756,761,215 P.3d 476, 481 (Idaho 2009), and St. Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI 
Assocs., LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 224 P.3d 1068 (2009); see also, Rule 51(b), LR.C.P. ("No party may 
assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless the party objects thereto before 
the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the instruction to which that party objects 
and the grounds of the objection,,).3 Even in the context of criminal proceedings under a similar 
rule, LC.R. 30(b), this Court will review an error injury instructions when no objection was made 
only if the error was so fundamental as to constitute a manifestly unjust due process violation. 
State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 749, 170 P.3d 886,892 (2007). 
3 As noted in Vanderford Co. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 556,165 P.3d 261,270 
(2007), Rule 51 (b) was amended to require a specific objection to an instruction. The amendment 
effectively overruled the common-law doctrine, as set forth in earlier cases. See, e.g., Suitts v. 
First Sec. Bank of Idaho, NA., 110 Idaho 15,713 P.2d 1374 (1985). 
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This line of authority stands for the proposition that a party must object to a jury instruction 
on a given issue, even a question of pure law, or that party does not preserve the issue for a motion 
for JNOV or for an appeal. Obviously, all parties are bound by this authority to continue to 
object, so that the district court has every opportunity to correct any errors before a JNOV or 
appeal becomes necessary. Not only did Mosell Equities fail to object, when given the 
opportunity to object, counsel stated: "But I like all of our instructions, so I'm not going to object 
to the Court's instructions." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 919, L. 25 - p. 920, L. 8). 
For similar reasons, Mosell Equities' failure to object to the relevant instructions 
constitutes invited error. "It has long been the law in Idaho that one may not successfully 
complain of errors one has acquiesced in or invited." State v. Owsley, 105 Idaho 836, 838, 763 
P.2d 436,438 (1983). As pointed out in Appellants' Brief, the record reflects that the parties were 
expressly given the opportunity to object to jury instructions. Mosell Equities had the motivation 
and opportunity to object to the trial court's instructions on contract formation and its failure to do 
so constitutes invited error. Cj, Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 433-34, 95 
P.3d 34,51-52 (2004) (even under an earlier version of Rule 51(b), where a party had the 
motivation and opportunity to object to jury instructions, it constituted invited error in failing to do 
so). 
Mosell Equities' only response is that it is excused from its own failure to object because 
the trial court could have granted a directed verdict on contract formation, but only did so, in 
effect, later at the JNOV stage. Plaintiffs suggestion is unsupported by authority or reason. 
Allowing such an exception would contradict the clear authority from this court that a party must 
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object even to errors oflaw in the jury instructions. See, e.g., St. Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. 
v. MRI Assocs., LLP, supra, 148 Idaho at 491 (regardless of whether, as a matter oflaw, a 
partnership was a partnership for a term, it was too late to raise that issue at JNOV or appeal if no 
objection was made to the relevant jury instruction). 
To the extent that Mosell Equities is arguing that its failure to object is excused by anything 
in High Valley Concrete, L.L.C v. Sargent, 149 Idaho 423, 234 P.3d 747 (2010), it is mistaken. 
There was no suggestion in High Valley Concrete that there was any failure to object to the 
relevant jury instructions on fiduciary duty. High Valley Concrete stands for the proposition that, 
in its exercise of free review, this Court may find that a district court erred in failing to grant a 
properly preserved motion for JNOV. It does not address the situation where a party fails to 
object and preserve an issue. 
Accordingly, Mosell Equities failed to preserve the issue of whether Exhibit 1 constituted a 
contract as a matter of law. Based on this failure, the trial court did not have the requisite basis 
upon which to grant JNOV on this same issue. Further, because the trial court indicated that a 
new trial was necessary only because of its ruling on this issue,4 both the JNOV and corresponding 
order for new trial must be vacated. 
4 At the hearing on the motion for JNOV, the trial court stated: "All I'm doing - I 
said, I'm setting aside the verdict because, as a matter oflaw, Exhibit 1 is a contract, a binding 
contract. What we don't know is what does it mean?" (JNOV Tr., Vol. I, p. 109, Ll. 7-10). To 
the extent that MoseH Equities is now claiming that the trial court suggested Exhibit 1 was 
unambiguous, it is mistaken. 
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2. Even if Mosell Equities somehow preserved the issue of contract formation for 
JNOV and appeal, there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. 
Mosell Equities complains that Berryhill & Company's "entire case" is that Exhibit 1 "is 
silent as to the parties' intent as to what happens if, for any reason, the transition does not occur" 
(Respondent's Brief: 23). Yet, as noted in Appellant's Brief, both the district court and the trial 
court ruled Exhibit 1 was ambiguous, because of this same language. And, as noted above, even 
at the JNOV hearing, the trial court indicated that, although it believed it should have instructed the 
jury that Exhibit 1 constituted a contract, a new jury would still have to determine "what does it 
mean?" By definition, an ambiguous contract has more than one possible meaning. Here, the 
jury obviously agreed a simple loan transaction was not intended by the parties, which was one of 
the possible meanings of Exhibit 1. The fact that Mosell Equities can point to certain evidence to 
dispute the jury's conclusion does not mean that the verdict was not supported by substantial, 
competent evidence. Moreover, Mosell Equities is not permitted to argue that there was no 
evidence of a sufficient quantity and probative value to support the jury's verdict as a way of 
getting around Rule 51(b). See, Bates, supra, 146 Idaho at 776, 203 P.3d at 706. 
When dealing with an alleged error injury instructions, an error is not grounds for a JNOV 
or new trial unless it misled the jury or prejudiced a party: 
Even where an instruction is erroneous, the error is not reversible unless the jury 
instructions taken as a whole mislead or prejudice a party. ld. Likewise, a special 
verdict form does not constitute reversible error unless it incorrectly instructed the 
jury as to the law or its form was confusing. VFP VC v. Dakota Co., 141 Idaho 
326,332, 109 P.3d 714,720 (2005) (citing Le'Gall v. Lewis Cnty.). 
Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., _ Idaho _,257 P.3d 755,758 (2011). Here, Mosell 
Equities does not contend the jury instructions and the special verdict form misstated the law or 
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were confusing. Rather, the contention is that it was prejudicial not to instruct the jury that 
Exhibit 1 constituted a contract. As pointed out in Appellant's Brief and discussed below at 
Section 3(B), no prejudice can be demonstrated because the jury could reasonably have found that 
no breach occurred, rather than no contract existed. 
3. Because no prejudicial error occurred, no new trial is required. 
"The judge does not have unlimited authority to disturb the verdict of a jury. Respect for 
the function of the jury prevents the granting of a new trial except in unusual circumstances." 
Pratton v. Gage, 122 Idaho 848, 850, 840 P.2d 392,394 (1992). Rule 61, I.R.C.P., states clearly: 
... no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the 
court ... is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict. .. unless 
refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. 
The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the 
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
(emphasis added) 
There are three problems with a new trial in this case. First, the trial court predicated the necessity 
of a new trial on its decision to grant JNOV on the contract formation issue. Thus, if the JNOV 
was improper for any reason, a second trial becomes unnecessary under the trial court's order. 
Because Mosell Equities failed to preserve its objection, the motion for JNOV was improperly 
granted and no new trial is required. Second, the trial court abused its discretion by misreading 
the jury verdict. Finally, no prejudicial error affecting substantial rights occurred so as to justify 
the time and expense of a new trial. 
A. If JNOV was improper for any reason, a new trial is also improper. 
First, as demonstrated above, Mosell Equities did not preserve the jury instruction issue for 
consideration on JNOV, but rather invited any error. It cannot now argue now that there was not 
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sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict as a way to attempt an end-run around Rule 51 (b), 
I.R.C.P. Bates v. Seldin, supra, 146 Idaho at 776, 203 P.3d at 706. According to the trial court, a 
new trial was only necessitated because it concluded that it should have instructed the jury that 
Exhibit 1 constituted a contract. If, however, as demonstrated above, Mosell Equities failed to 
preserve the issue for consideration on JNOV, then the trial court's basis for ordering a new trial 
likewise was not preserved. 
B. The trial court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial. 
There was also an abuse of discretion in that the trial court misinterpreted what the jury did 
in the special verdict. At the hearing on JNOV the trial court stated: 
And so, I'm setting aside the verdict where they unanimously found no contract 
because - I'm reading the standard for judgment NOV - evidence is of sufficient 
quan - the evidence is not of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable 
minds could reach that same conclusion as did the jury. So, I'm calling all 12 
jurors unreasonable. It's the first time I've ever done that in 27 years. 
(emphasis added) 
(JNOV Tr., Vol. I, p. 104, LL 6-13). Unfortunately, the trial court's decision was based on a 
misreading of the special verdict. The jurors were not asked "was Exhibit 1 a contract?" 
Instead, they were asked "was there an express contract between Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, 
and Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., which was breached?" (emphasis added) (R., Vol. I, p. 
1292, LL 14-15). It was to this very different question that the jurors answered no unanimously. 
Further, the trial court indicated at the very same JNOV hearing that the issue as to whether 
the contract was breached remained a jury question: 
What I don't know, and the jury - and both Berryhill and Mosell has a right to have 
the jury determine, is, was there modifications to Exhibit No.1, or were there 
subsequent office - offers and acceptance and contracts that may have a different 
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intent; was there substantial performance by plaintiffs of Exhibit 1; if there was, 
was there a breach, a wrongful breach, of the contract Exhibit 1 by defendant; and if 
there was a breach, how much damages? 
(emphasis added) 
(JNOV Tr., Vol. I, p. 103, Ll. 13-21). Thus, the trial court mistakenly assumed the unanimous 
jury based its decision on "no contract," when they could have based it on "no breach." This 
mistake means that the court's decision on JNOV and new trial motions was not rendered "through 
the outer bounds of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards" and "through an 
exercise of reason," as required even under the more lenient standard for new trial. See, e.g., 
Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 512-13,181 P.3d 435, 438-39 (2007). 
Mosell Equities fails to address this flaw in the trial court's reasoning, although Defendants 
raised it in Appellant's Brief (p. 28). 
C. No prejudicial error occurred, because the verdict was in accord with 
the clear weight of the evidence. 
The jury's unanimous verdict that there was no breach is supported by sufficient evidence 
under Rule 59(a)(6), I.R.C.P. Pursuant to this rule, the trial court must "determine (1) whether the 
verdict is against his or her view of the clear weight of the evidence; and (2) whether a new trial 
would produce a different result." Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., 2012 Ida. LEXIS 95 (Idaho Apr. 13, 
2012). Any motion for a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence must "set forth the 
factual grounds therefor with particularity." Rule 59(a)(7), LR.C.P; Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 
Idaho 423, 430,196 P.3d 341, 348 (2008). Here, the trial court made no such particularized 
findings. It simply mistakenly believed the jury had found "no contract," an assumed state of 
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affairs with which the trial court could not agree. Such represents an abuse of its discretion under 
Rule 59(a)(6). 
The trial court did not and could not find that the jury's unanimous decision there was "no 
breach" of a loan agreement was against the clear weight of the evidence. The parties were acting 
together as partners in the activities of the restaurant move downtown, they were jointly signing 
guarantees of leases and procuring expansion space for both Polo Cove and the restaurant (Tr., 
Vol. I, p. 885, L. 102; p. 626, L. 12- p. 628, L. 25). 5 The funds at issue were placed on the books 
of Berryhill & Company in a "holding pattern," as accountant Amy Dempsey testified, while the 
parties attempted to finalize their actual agreement as to the "buy-in" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 796, L.1 - p. 
797, L. 2). She did not consider the funds to be either a loan or equity, because the parties, 
including Mosell, would never clarify the nature of the funds to her (Tr., Vol. I, p. 795, Ll. 3-20). 
Even Mosell said that the categorization of the funds as a "loan" was simply an "interim 
substitute." Rather than initially making demand on Berryhill & Company for repayment of any 
"loan" amount, MoseH testified that he approached Mr. Berryhill in the summer of2008 and 
suggested a deal where MoseH would own fewer shares and get some cash back (Tr., Vol. I, p. 324, 
Ll. 10-12). He also referred to his "investment/divestment in BerryhiH and the lease" (Tr., Vol. 
I, p. 414, Ll. 10-13) and "my capital contributions" (Tr. Vol. I., p. 416, Ll. 4-6). The obvious 
inference from this evidence is that the parties were structuring a "buy-in," not contemplating a 
lender-borrower relationship. 
5 Based on Glenn MoseH's assurances that the term "loan" was only used because 
"we have to call it something" and other conduct, the jury could also have concluded that MoseH 
Equities should be equitably estopped from enforcing any purported loan contract. See Jury 
Instruction 20 (R., Vol. I, p. 1267, Ll. 1-11). 
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Accordingly, the jury's finding of no breach was not contrary to the clear weight of the 
evidence. 
4. The district court and trial court properly excluded Plaintiff's Exhibit I. 
Rule 408 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence prohibits, inter alia, statements made in the 
context of "negotiations." Rule 401 is the basic relevancy rule. Plaintiff's Exhibit I, by its own 
terms, indicates that it is made in response to a demand letter by a former counsel to Plaintiff or 
Plaintiff's owner. Such letters outlining the positions of the parties are simply not admissible to 
prove liability. In Millenkamp v. Davisco Foods Int'l, Inc., 562 F.3d 971, 978 (9th Cir. 2009) the 
Ninth Circuit ruled that the district court erred in admitting into evidence the defendant's response 
to the plaintiff's initial settlement demand. While the letter at issue may be correspondence 
"showing liability, it is not admissible for that purpose." 562 F.3d at 980. The Ninth Circuit also 
ruled that the defendant's response to the settlement demand was not relevant. It had no tendency 
to make any fact of consequence any more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Ibid. 
Similarly, in this case, Plaintiff's Exhibit I sets forth nothing but the litigation position of 
Defendants in response to a settlement demand made on behalf of Plaintiff. It contains no 
evidence making any fact more or less probable, but merely states the position of Defendants in 
response to initiation of negotiations. Based on both Rule 408 and Rule 401, it was not 
admissible. The district court agreed with this argument and struck the same exhibit on summary 
judgment. (R., Vol. I, p. 753, Ll. 6-7). The trial court similarly granted Defendants' motion in 
limine as to Exhibit 1. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 297, L. 23 - p. 298, L. 5). 
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ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Defendants continue to request attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-123(3). The 
"gravamen" ofMosell Equities' claim deals with a commercial transaction under Great Plains 
Equip. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 471, 36 P.3d 218,223 (2001). Further, 
MoseH Equities alleges a commercial transaction and claimed entitlement to fees pursuant to I.e. § 
12-120(3) in its complaint (R. Vol. I, p. 98, Ll. 19-22). See, Garner v. Pavey, _ Idaho _,259 P.3d 
608, 615 (2011). Thus, Defendant should be granted its attorney fees, including those on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that this Court vacate the 
trial court's grant of JNOV and related new trial order and remand for entry of judgment pursuant 
to the jury verdict. Berryhill & Company also requests its costs and attorney fees on this appeal. 
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CROSS RESPONDENTS' BRIEF ON CROSS APPEAL 
Cross Respondents Berryhill & Company, Inc., and John E. Berryhill III ("Defendants") 
hereby provide their Brief on Cross-Appellant Mosell Equities, LLC's ("Mosell Equities" or 
"Plaintiff') Cross Appeal. Defendants incorporate the relevant portions of Appellants' Brief and 
the foregoing Reply on their own appeal. 
INTRODUCTION 
Mosell Equities argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant its motion for JNOV on 
its breach of written contract claim in its entirety. In its view, the trial court should have found not 
just that Exhibit 1 was a contract, but that it was an unambiguous loan contract that was breached 
by Berryhill & Company.6 Mosell Equities cannot be heard to make this argument, however, for 
it conceded in its own proposed jury instructions and proposed special verdict that Exhibit 1 was 
ambiguous. 
ST ATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants hereby incorporate the Statement of the Case section of its Appellant's Brief as 
if set forth herein. 
ISSUES ON CROSS APPEAL 
1. Whether Judge Goff should have granted Mosell Equities' Motion for JNOV on 
Count 1 in its entirety. 
6 
"Consequently, the only issue left for consideration at a new trial is whether 
Berryhill & Co. breached the loan agreement when it denied through counsel any loan existed and 
refused to repay. However, that issue is resolved on this appeal." (Respondent-Cross 
Appellant's Brief, p. 36). 
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2. Whether Defendants are entitled to attorney fees on cross appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Mosell Equities failed to preserve a motion for JNOV or appeal on breach of 
an unambiguous contract. 
As noted above, under Rule 51 (b) a party is required to object to jury instructions on an 
issue to preserve an issue for consideration on a motion for JNOV or appeal. Bates v. Seldin, 146 
Idaho 772, 203 P.3d 702 (2009). Rather than object, which it did not, Mosell Equities itself 
invited any error by submitting jury instructions and a form of special verdict that both considered 
Exhibit 1 ambiguous and placed the issue of breach with the jury. Mosell Equities submitted its 
requested Jury Instruction based on IDJI 1.41.2 (R., Vol. I, p. 1026, Ll. 10-14). Mosell Equities 
further requested a special verdict that placed the interpretation of the ambiguous contract squarely 
in front of the jury. In its "Proposed Verdict Form" Plaintiff sought the following question for the 
jury at #1: " ... did the parties intend the money Mosell Equities provided, $50,000.00, to be a 
loan?" At #2, it requested the following question of the jury: "did the parties intend the money 
Mosell Equities provided $50,000.00 to be a loan to remain a loan pending Mosell Equities' 
"buy-in" of an entity formed by the parties?" (R., Vol. I, p. 1027, Ll. 1-4). 
Thus, ifthere was any error, which Defendants deny, Plaintiff invited such error and may 
not now raise this issue on appeal. State v. Owsley, 105 Idaho 836, 838, 763 P.2d 436, 438 
(1983). 
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2. As both the district court and trial court found repeatedly, Exhibit 1 was 
ambiguous. 
As argued in Sections 4(a) and (b) of Appellant's Brief, the district court and the trial court 
treated Exhibit 1 as ambiguous throughout the course of the litigation, as did the parties. It refers 
to both a "loan" and a "buy-in," two very different kinds of transactions. As the trial court noted 
even at the lNOV hearing, it also refers to a buy-in into an entity that was never formed: "it 
becomes ambiguous because there's no MoBerry Venture Corporation." (lNOV Tr., Vol. I, p. 38, 
Ll. 3_4). 7 "A contract term is ambiguous when there are two different reasonable interpretations 
or the language is nonsensical." Potlatch Education Ass'n v. Potlatch School District No. 285, 
148 Idaho 630, 633, 226 P.3d 1277, 1280 (2010) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
Where a contract is ambiguous, the intent of the interpretation of the contract is a factual issue 
which focuses on the intent of the parties. Pines Grazing Ass In v. Flying Joseph Ranch, LLC, _ 
Idaho _,265 P.3d 1136, 1143 (2011), citing, Page v. Pasqua/i, 150 Idaho 150, _,244 P.3d 
1236, 1238 (2010). That was what the parties and the jury spent almost two weeks doing. 
At certain points, however, but not including the jury instruction phase, Plaintiff opted to 
pursue this litigation as if there were no ambiguity and as if only a loan was mentioned and 
intended. It sought recovery only on a loan theory, which it was free to do. Now that the jury has 
resolved the ambiguity against Plaintiff, however, it is not for this Court to make a contrary factual 
7 The trial court also commented: "And when I read Exhibit 21 and apply it to 
Exhibit 1, there's a - there can be a legitimate argument, that reasonable minds could differ on, as 
to how much is the loan for, what does the buy-in mean, what happens if MoBerry's not 
completed, is that substantial performance?" (lNOV Tr., Vol. I, p. 105, Ll. 6-11) 
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determination. As set forth herein, there was ample evidence, including some directly from 
Plaintiff's principal, that no loan was intended by either party.8 
3. Rescission is unavailable. 
Mosell Equities cites Simpson v. Johnson, 100 Idaho 357, 597 P.2d 600 (1979) in support 
of its new argument that it is entitled to rescission and return of all check funds (Respondent's 
Brief: 39). What Simpson v. Johnson actually stands for is the proposition that a party, having 
elected the remedy of damages rather than rescission, will have failed to meet its burden of proof in 
establishing rescission damages. 100 Idaho at 362, 597 P.2d at 605. Here, Mosell Equities did 
not plead rescission and did not seek it at trial. Rather, Plaintiff urged exclusively that it was 
entitled to return of all check funds as damages for an unpaid loan. It is not now able to try a 
different case on appeal. 
Moreover, as the trial court noted at the JNOV hearing, when the court noted the absence of 
any alternative theory on the part of Plaintiff, "Berryhill had an adequate defense [to rescission]. 
Can't do that, can't bring us back to the condition we were previous to the entering of the 
agreements" (JNOV Tr., p. 12, Ll. 11-13). As this Court explained in Cady v. Pitts, 102 Idaho 86, 
90,625 P.2d 1089, 1093 (1981), "upon a decree of rescission, the question then becomes one of 
damages to restore the status quo as much as possible." Not only was there a failure of proof on 
this issue by Plaintiff, the trial court noted that it was not possible to return the parties to their 
8 It was only an "interim substitute." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 322, L. 22 - p. 323, L. 16). 
What Plaintiff was doing was buying the Berryhill brand. "That's why I paid $25,000 for John's 
consulting work and then $400,000 for that branding." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 367, Ll. 21-23). "And that's 
exactly why I paid $400,000 for half the business, to use that name and to brand the wine country 
restaurant out there; true." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 362, Ll. 11-13). 
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previous position. The check funds were not sitting in an account, but rather had been invested 
largely in a move to, and tenant improvements in, a new downtown restaurant location, ballroom 
and Polo Cove showroom (Tr., Vol. I, p. 357, L. 10 - p. 358, L. 5), which both parties desired (Tr., 
Vol. I, p. 579, L. 18 - p. 580, L. 10). Accordingly, the trial court correctly found rescission 
impossible even if there were not a failure of proof. 
4. Berryhill & Company is entitled to have a jury consider the defense of 
equitable estoppel. 
Plaintiff argues that this Court should decide on appeal that Defendants' equitable estoppel 
defense is factually inadequate (Respondent's Brief: 37-39). After hearing all ofthe evidence, the 
trial court concluded that it was appropriate to submit to the jury this defense, which became 
Instruction No. 20 (R., Vol. I, p. 1267, Ll. 1-11). Defendant Berryhill & Company contended 
throughout the litigation that by insisting on calling the funds a "loan," while simultaneously 
assuring Defendant that they would not remain such, Plaintiff s principal, Glenn Mosell, induced 
Defendant to accept the funds under false pretenses and should be estopped from enforcing any 
loan contract. He misrepresented his own current intent as to the funds and the use of the word 
"loan." A misrepresentation of current intent can form the basis for fraud, so obviously also for 
estoppel. See, Hudson v. Cobbs, 118 Idaho 474,517,797 P.2d 1322,1365 (1990). 
Like waiver or fraud, equitable estoppel involves a factual inquiry. Upon any new trial, 
Berryhill & Company is entitled to have a jury consider whether Plaintiff should be equitably 
estopped in its attempts to enforce a purported loan contract. 
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A TTORNEY FEES ON CROSS APPEAL 
Defendants respectfully request attorney fees on this cross appeal pursuant to I.e. § 
12-123(3). The "gravamen" of Mosell Equities' claim deals with a commercial transaction under 
Great Plains Equip. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 471, 36 P.3d 218,223 (2001). 
Further, Mosell Equities alleges a commercial transaction and claimed entitlement to fees pursuant 
to I.e. § 12-120(3) in its complaint (R. Vol. I, p. 98, Ll. 19-22). See, Garner v. Pavey, _ Idaho_, 
259 P.3d 608, 615 (2011). Thus, Defendant should be granted its attorney fees, including those 
on cross-appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that this Court deny Cross 
Appellant's request to remand with instructions to enter Judgment on Count 1 for any amount 
against Berryhill & Company. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED This fl e April, 2012. 
THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP 
s 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Ie. fb-
I hereby certify that on this L-L- day of April, 2012, I served two copies of the foregoing 
instrument on opposing counsel as indicated below: 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P. O. Box 2504 
Eagle, ID 83616 
__ Via Hand Delivery 
Via Facsimile - 939-7136 
~ia U.S. Mail 
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